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Theology: Also (Green) Religious Experience
Seeking Understanding
Thomas Hughson 5.]
Religious experience in contemporary theological epistemology is
a theme broad enough to allow for many approaches. This essay grants
the concept of 'religious experience' tentative validity, subject to later
qualification. The actual experience explored will be a 'green' experience
of non-human nature that many Christians have in common with many
non-Christians. The first section describes it in a general way, while the
second probes its character as a possible 'religious experience'. Then, a
third section begins to explore its theological significance. A conclusion
emphasizes the essential, dynamic partnership between theologicalmethod
and non-methodical elements, such as religious experiences in general
and the 'green' experience in particular.
I. What Is the Green Experience of Nature?
The green experience of nature is typically a post-modern mode of
human consciousness of non-human nature that intends, feels, judges,
appreciates, and relates to non-human nature as worthy of respect close
to reverence. Treating the modern ideal of progress with irony, it alters the
human/nature relationship from a primarily utilitarian approach to nature
as available resource to a primary respect for nature from within mem-
o bership in what naturalist AIdo Leopold called an ecological community.'
It is commonsensical rather than theoretical in the sense that it is pri-
marily an affective, practical sensibility. Nonetheless it can incorporate
knowledge of natural science, direct observation of concrete details in ani-
mals, plants, and terrain, immediate presence to nature in wilderness, or
in pocket parks within urban areas, aswell as in poetry and art. Nourished
by scientific knowledge, it does not derive from it. Since I maintain that
it is primarily not secondarily a direct, affectively-toned relation to nature,
it will be helpful to point to some examples of theoretically sophisticated
I. AIdo Leopold, Sand County Almanac (New York: Sierra Club/Ballantine, 1972).
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writers whose relation to nature nevertheless did not spring from either
their theoretical knowledge or from ethical universals common in society.
John Muir's daily, boyhood enjoyment of the natural environment
in Scotland and later in Wisconsin grounded both his adult love for sci-
ence and his steadfast devotion to preserving wilderness in California.'
Similarly, AIdo Leopold's change of mind about the conventional wild-
life management plan to exterminate wolves to protect deer herds did
not stem from his grasp of a new theory but from seeing what he called
the "green fire" dying in the eyes of an adult she-wolf he had just shot and
mortally wounded. American Protestant theologian Sallie McFague's
own love for nature and her professional commitment to ecotheology did
not stem from theoretical knowledge. Rather, her love arose in experien-
tial, personal contact with nature - unsupervised girlhood forays to look
at turtles in a Cape Cod pond, adult hiking in the woods. She underlines
the lasting impact of a child's 'first naivete' in regard to nature. Without
this absorbed wonder an adult's 'second naivete' enlightened by science,
general education, and nature writing, seems much less likely," The roots
of an educated, adult love for nature are direct experience and a first love.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that these direct experiences of nature
do not consist only or largely in the kind of overwhelming episodes of
oceanic feelings of oneness with the cosmos that McFague criticizes for
blinding people to the actual otherness and the independent finalities of
natural, non-human beings. That is not to belittle the appeal of sunrise
and sunset vistas, it is only to anchor love for nature in closer, more
patient, more frequent kinds of presence wherein non-human nature
does not provide so obvious a spectacle. Muir, it is true, combined a rap-
turous sense of oneness with majestic Sequoia trees and the rugged Sierra
Nevada mountains with careful study of glaciation. Christian theologians
too enter into reflection on green experience of nature on the basis of
something more direct and less theoretical than an interest in overcoming
Western Christian Schiipfimgsvergessenheit that neglects the First Article
in the Creed."
2. See especially, John Muir, The Story of My Boyhood and Youth, with Illustrations
from Sketches by the Author (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913).
3. Sallie McFague recounts her childhood experience in Super,Natural Christians: Should
Christians Love Nature? (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1997) 120-123, and adult experience
in Life Abundant: Rethinking Theology and Economy for a Planet in Peril (Minneapolis,
MN: Fortress, 2001) 6.
4. Per Lenning, Creation - An Ecumenical Challenge: Reflections Issuingfrom a Study
by the Institute fOr Ecumenical Research,Strasbourg, France (Macon, GA: Mercer Univer-
sity, 1989) 45.
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To say that green experience of nature is postmodern does not deny
all dependence on modernity. In fact, it takes place in people whose his-
torical and social reality bears the imprint of economic relations to nature
shaped by age-old agriculture, then by modern science, technology, and
secularization, all of which are presupposed influences that function as
conditions for the possibility of green experience. That is, science, tech-
nology, and secularization - however much they have led into the envi-
ronmental crisis - have enabled people in the modern West to disen-
tangle a positive experience of non-human nature from practical fears of
predators, unpredictable droughts, climate changes, and unreliable food
supplies. Chthonic powers that haunted pre-scientific cultures, often
believed to exercise a more or less capricious sovereignty over major
aspects of human personal and social existence, such as birth, health,
prosperity, death, social survival, war, peace, etc., do not for the most part
trouble the modern West, though some nostalgia for the positive ele-
ments in those cultures may make some wish they did.
However, "For Inuit hunters, weather ruled. Humans were puny figures
who lived in a voracious and everlastingcountry of winters ... Neerivik ...
was the goddess of the waters ... and was easily angered.": Whatever the
many other merits and the overall integrity of the Inuit way of life, it
was not a green experience of nature. Freedom from fears of Neerivik and
others is typically modern not pre-historic, and not (to a lesser extent)
pre-modern. That's the point missed by critiques that blame Christian-
ity and the Bible for modernity's exploitative dominion over nature. 6
Gentile and non-Christian religious cultures have spiritual depths often
overlooked or minimized. Nonetheless, as the deutero-Pauline Letter to
the Colossians indicates, the missions of Christ and the Holy Spirit did
change perceptions of non-human nature in the direction of freedom
from intimidation by cosmic powers. Christianity and her headstrong
child, modernity, have liberated the West from many fears projected onto
and rebounding from non-human nature. Too much so, some might feel.
At the same time, doubts about modernity have arisen. Late-nine-
teenth and twentieth-century applications of science and technology to
weaponry put to rest, if nothing else did, the comfortable modern ideal
of progress through reason, science and technology. World War I was the
5. Gretel Ehrlich, This Cold Heaven: Seven Seasons in Greenland (New York: Vintage
Books, 2001) 22.
6. Lynn White, Jr., in "The Historical Roots of Our Environmental Crisis," Science
155 (1967) 12°3-12°7, held Christian belief in human "dominion" accountable for the
ecological crisis.
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watershed. The development and use of atomic weapons to conclude
World War II, followed by nuclear standoff in the Cold War, forced
recognition that advances in scientific knowledge of nature do not guar-
antee progress in human well being. This, and a much less common crit-
icism of the technological imperative ("if it can be done, it must be
done"), have ushered people from narrow modern optimism to a broad,
ill-defined postmodern condition. Skepticism about the modern ideal of
progress typifies the postrnodern condition. That skepticism belongs to
the green experience of nature."
As a result, contrary to Francis Bacon's well-known counsel, more and
more people tend to relate to non-human nature apart from a typically
modern, anthropocentric assumption that nature's very existence is for the
sake of humans, whether as an object for scientific knowledge or as a
resource for practical uses. Yet this does not represent an anti-scientific
turn. To the contrary, outstanding nature writers, ecological theologians,
and ordinary nature-lovers, Christian and non-Christian alike, proceed
in light of scientific understanding of evolution. So a postmodern, green
experience of non-human nature is not indifferent to science, but it does
underscore the difference between science and wisdom. One thread in
wisdom's tapestry is movement beyond relating to non-human nature on
the basis of its relation to human sustenance and understanding."
This sensibility likewise perceives the world as an ecological commu-
nity embracing humanity and non-human nature. Green experience of
nature involves a sense of commonality with nature. This is a being-with-
nature that accompanies respect for the in-itself-ness of every non-human
natural being. The being-with nature, including the community with it,
recognizes that prior to being an instrument to human ends, which it also
secondarily is, non-human nature exists for its own ends. Often, this is
remarked in the phrase: 'the intrinsic significance' of nature. Moreover,
the ecological community is asymmetrical. Humans depend on non-
human nature in ways that are not reciprocal. Fish don't need fisher-folk.
Wheat can flourish in an uncultivated way without farmers. Mountains
don't need hikers. Minerals and metals don't need miners, steel mills or
manufacturing. Most of non-human nature (certain viruses, bacteria and
parasites excluded) flourishes without depending on human existence,
7. For a similar view see the "Greens" entry in Stuart Sim (ed.), The RoutledgeCompanion
to Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 2002) 264-265. He comments that "The Green move-
ment can be regarded as postmodern in its generally skeptical artirude towards progress ... ," 265.
8. McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 9I-I17, for example, proposes a subject-ro-sub-
jeer relation to nature as a substitute for the commonly practiced subject-to-object relation.
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would continue without it, and may be harmed by it. While it once may
have been the case that humans were on the prey list of certain carnivores,
they are so no longer. No large predators had or have the human species
as the main source of food.
Aristotle isolated reason as the specific difference that distinguished
humans from other animals. This involved but did not emphasize generic
commonality. His attentive study of various animal species and individu-
als evoked a sense of wonder. Yet this kind of fascination did not neces-
sarily encompass a sense of community with the natural realities analyzed,
distinguished and classified. In that respect the wonder that generates
methodical, scientific investigation of nature differs somewhat from the
kind of wonder in a child's 'first naivete' or in the green experience of
nature as a 'second naivete'. Nonetheless, Aristotle's often-criticized sub-
stance/accident analysis pointed out that every non-human living being
had the ontological status of a substance that existed of itself not in or as
part of another entity. His substance metaphysics held that, prior to a sta-
tus of being instrumental to use, non-human animals had a primary sta-
tus as existing substances. His metaphysics, consequently, is compatible
with green experience.
This means, for example, that an ant, a tree, a deer, a horse, a wolf,
possibly a mountain or solar system, each exist with an independent
tendency to their own perfection or flourishing, not with an internal,
constitutive orientation to human flourishing. Their existence tends
toward their own flourishing. Secondarily and potentially, they also can
become objects for human acts of understanding, appreciation, and use.
Consequently, natural entities are-for-us as instruments to human ends
only because they first of all exist-in-themselves. Reversing this priority,
or blindness to it, as if non-human natural realities were first of all instru-
mental to human ends, is the error that produces the instrumentalist
mentality rejected in the green experience. Indeed, because of an onto-
logical status that involves, with human animals, change and mortality,
non-human animals form a community of mortal existents with human
beings who likewise exist both in-themselves and for-others. Animal
rights advocates, nevertheless, pin the blame for instrumentalism squarely
on Aristotle whose view in The Politics, followed by Aquinas, was that
since "nature makes nothing to no purpose, it must be that nature has
made them [animals, plants] for the sake of man."? Here, his analysis of
9. Aristotle, The Politics, translated by T. A. Sinclair, revised by T. ]. Saunders (Har-
rnondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985) 79. Quoted by A. Linzey in "Introduction: Is Chris-
tianity Irredeemably Speciesist?," Animals on the Agenda, ed. Andrew Linzey and Dorothy
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purposes does not clarify the primary ontological status of what secon-
darily becomes instrumental, leaving his principle of subordinate pur-
poses apparently irreconcilable with a green experience of nature. He
seems the philosopher of species-ism.
Species-ism is "a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests
of members of one's own species and against those of members of other
species."? Species-ism, like sexism and racism, is regarded as a "preju-
dice involving a preference for one's own kind, based on a shared char-
acteristic that in itself has no moral relevance.'?' Animal welfare and
animal rights advocates locate its most objectionable feature in human
indifference to animal suffering. Sometimes this critique minimizes the
significance of human difference and in that fails to do justice to the ani-
mal/human relation. For example, the anti-species-ism argument does-
n't account for the fact that non-human animal species, not the human
species, are the most relentless utilitarians and instrumentalists. Only
the human species relates in non-utilitarian ways to individuals and
species by, for instance, acknowledging the sentience of fellow animals
as a reason not to kill and eat them. Many other predatory species, such
as lions and wolves, do not have or exercise an option to switch over
to a prey-friendly, ethical vegetarianism. Nonetheless, I will hazard the
opinion that the green awareness of natural community among all ani-
mal species is a positive theme redeeming an otherwise overdrawn cri-
tique of 'species-ism'.
I am not arguing, though I suspect it is true, that an experiential (with
shades of Schleiermacher!), personal sensibility like the green experience
sketched above has given rise to and has sustained green currents in
Yamamoto (London: SCM, 1998) xiii. Aquinas mediated Aristotle's instrumentalism
to Western Christianity, according to the criticism of Andrew Linzey and Dan Cohn-
Sherbok (eds.), After Noah: Animals and the Liberation of Theology (London: Mowbray,
1997) 7. In answering questions such as, is it lawful or not to kill a living thing to take
as food, Aquinas in the Summa TheologiaeIa, 64, I, stated that it was lawful to use plants
for animal food or animals for human food since the less perfect exists for the more
perfect, and so animals are for the good of man. Animal rights advocates who criticize
this view seem to assume that Aquinas' ethical instrumentalism (it is legitimate to use
animals and non-human nature, which is there for use) is the same as ontological instru-
mentalism (non-human nature does not have an existence except as instrumental to the
human good). However, in Arisrorelian/Thomisr analysis of instrumental causality, there
is no denying an independent existence to substances that exist in their own right yet may
also serve as instruments to human ends.
10. Singer, Animal Liberation, 6, referred to by Dale Jamieson, in "The Rights of
Animals and the Demands of Nature," a talk at Marquette University on September 12,
2003 in the Philosophy Colloquium series.
II. Jamieson, "The Rights of Animals."
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Western cultures in a more basic way than has agreement with various
theoretical principles. Green thought about the environmental crisis
- imaginatively receiving a new "universe story.':" or debating the moral
equivalence of all sentient life/3 for example - however influential these
may be, probably follows from green experience, be it the experience of
a back-yard or a household pet. I propose only that a non-instrumental
experience of nature verging on reverence supports a broad green current
in contemporary Western cultures more basic and pervasive than Green
political movements, though with an affinity for them. It seems likely that
an affectivesensibility of appreciative respect for non-human nature nour-
ishes rather than derives from ethical concern for the ecological crisis, for
the environment, for wilderness, for endangered species of animals, and
for humane treatment of domesticated animals.
2. Green Experience of Nature: Is It 'Religious Experience'?
Now, recognition of non-human natural realities as real and worth-
while, independent of how humans understand or use them, has fallen
within the ambit of ethical concern in churches. The purpose in this sec-
tion, more in line with the philosophy of religion, is to see if that green
experience of nature qualifies as somehow a religious experience, in the
sense of being an instance of, or closely related to, experience of the
sacred.
A prefatory surmise is that the adjective, 'religious', has so deeply
qualified the noun, 'experience', that discrete semantic, philosophical
and historical analyses of their separate meanings cannot arrive at the
meaning of the noun/adjective synthesis. The combination has become
irresolvable because, to a significant extent, two centuries of usage in
a Western, mainly Jewish and Christian, context has supplied a tacit ref-
erent for 'religious experience': biblical and post-biblical accounts of
contact with the divine. So 'religious experience' has become sui generis
in meaning, rather than simply being one more logically distinct species
of the genus, 'experience', alongside 'political experience', 'aesthetic
12. See Thomas Berry and Brian Swimme, The Universe Story: From the Primordial
Flaring Forth to the EcozoicAge - A Celebration of the Unfolding of the Cosmos (San Fran-
cisco, CA: HarperCollins, 1992).
13. See Peter Singer, "All Animals Are Equal," Unsanctifjing Human Life: Essays in
Ethics, ed. Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse (London: Blackwell, 2002, originally published
in 1972) 80-94.
100 THOMAS HUGHSON
experience', etc. This confers an advantage. I suggest that the concept
of 'religious experience' can survive a (welcome) deconstruction of the
modern Western categories, 'religion' and 'religious'.«
That is, hermeneutical deconstruction of 'religion' and 'religious' prob-
ably can show that they have carried meanings able to be suborned into
subservience to the exercise of Western power over some non-Western
peoples. For example, the US government and military, dedicated to
upholding the US Constitution with its First Amendment protections of
'religious' liberty, crushed the Plains Indians in the decades following the
US Civil War. This campaign executed by the US Cavalry disrupted ties
binding the Sioux, Cheyenne and Arapaho tribes to their traditional lands,
to the buffalo herds and to a way of life dependent on both. Land and
buffalo were sacred; they had religious meaning and powers. Deliberate
destruction of the buffalo herds and forced confinement of people to reser-
vations violated the Indians' practice of religion, not to mention their
political sovereignty. But their diffuse kind of religion spread through all
dimensions of life was inaccessible and unrecognizable because it didn't fit
the US concepts of 'religion' and 'religious' that divided off 'religion' as a
sphere of institutional activity separated from the rest of life which was
then deemed secular,"
Governmental violations of Indian religious liberty were invisible to
white Americans because religion didn't seem to be involved at all, only
supposedly non-religious realities like land and buffalo. In light of that,
it has to be admitted that the concept of 'religious experience' has the
potential to be drawn into and made subservient to abuses of power rather
than being purely an academic concept circulating in a realm of free
inquiry, truth, and justice. That, I think, does not terminate its effective
life, but an historically-justified hermeneutic of suspicion does need to
raise a constant question about how the category, 'religion' and its cognate
'religious experience' do or do not serve the interests of policies enacted
by nation-states, and perhaps the expansion of global corporations.
So, 204 years after Friedrich Schleiermacher's On Religion,'6 the con-
cept of 'religious experience' has proven as problematic as it is invaluable
14. For an overview, see Kathleen M. Sands, "Tracking Religion: Religion Through the
Lens of Critical and Cultural Studies," The Council of Societiesfor the Study of Religion
Bulletin 31/3 (Sept. 2002) 68-74.
15. Kathleen M. Sands, in a paper presented at the 2002 American Academy of Reli-
gion meeting.
16. Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, intro-
duced by Rudolf Otto, translated by John Oman (New York: Harper & Row, 1958).
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and open to development. The green experience of nature, though, does
not instantiate the major developments in the meanings of that concept.
In what way then can green experience be called a 'religious experience'?
At the very least, many contemporary religious teachings have responded
to the ecological crisis by advocating a revised relation to nature on
grounds of renewed fidelity to religion. The green experience has made
inroads into Christian concern insofar as churches have placed the eco-
logical crisis on their agendas. But is it also religious in a stronger sense?
I think so. The World Council of Churches 1990 World Convocation
on Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation in Seoul, South Korea
affirmed that "God loves the creation ... Because creation is of God and
the goodness of God permeates all creation, we hold all life as sacred ...
the world, as God's handiwork, has its own inherent integrity: that land,
waters, air, forests, mountains, and all creatures, including humanity, are
'good' in God's sight."? These statements refer to the cosmos in its own
right as sacral reality because created by God, not because human beings
later dedicated or consecrated it.
Such respect for non-human nature involves apprehension of its real-
ity and worth pre-existing the self-evident intelligence and power of
humanity, as manifesting attributes of the Creator. But the language of
environmental concern, contrary to postliberal arguments that language
and doctrine produce rather than express religious experience, has not by
itself generated the green experience of nature. The proof is that the green
experience has tended not to solidify or exemplify traditional religious
language and doctrine but to challenge them to develop. In light of the
WCC statements, awareness of beauty, power, consistency and unpre-
dictability in non-human nature coupled with respect for nature's own
reality can be a conviction that the cosmos is sacred. The green experi-
ence, consequently, belongs to, or is close to, religious experience since
its feelings of respect for nature indicate a being-moved in a way that is
close enough to reverence to qualify as somewhat like experiences of the
sacred. This justifies thinking of the green experience too as in a broad
sense 'religious', or at least in some way as 'spiritual'." That is, modern
17. Michael Kinnamon and Brian E. Cope (eds.), The Ecumenical Movement: An
Anthology of Key Texts and Voices (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997) 317-324, at
322-3:3, "~ffirmation VII" of "Ten Affirmations on Justice, Peace and the Integrity of
Creation.
18. See Michael C. Kalton, "Green Spirituality: Horizontal Transcendence," The Psy-
chology of Mature Spirituality: Integrity, Wisdom, Transcendence,ed. Melvin E. Miller
(London: Routledge, 2000) 187-200.
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secularization, science and technology have not done away with appre-
ciation for the sacred depths of nature. Nor did a theology of secularity
in the 1960'Sand 70's suppress it, despite the fact that secular theology
"virtually denied any veneration of nature issuing not only from non-
Christian religions or religion in general bur also from Christian adora-
tion of God the Creator of the cosrnos.?'?
Not specifically Catholic nor exclusivelyChristian, the practical, green
sensibility has not arisen in response to, though it does not need to
oppose, such Christian mediations of divine things as Scripture, tradition,
liturgy, witness and personal prayer. Nor does it stand in place of, or
have a capacity to be, a proof for the existence of God, since the expe-
rience need not coincide with theism. Clearly too, it differs from what
spiritual theology has called 'experimental' knowledge of divine things,
as well as from private revelations, insofar as its object is not an invisible
reality in the economy of salvation, such as Mary, Jesus, the Trinity, the
Eucharist as real presence of Christ, saints, angels, etc. It is a humble
experience both in comparison with those of the great mystics and saints,
and because it concerns 'humus', the earth we walk over beneath skies
we recognize as a physical cosmos. In the life of St. Ignatius Loyola, it
would be akin to his nighttime experience of stargazing rather than to his
Trinitarian vision at the Cardoner River.20
But respect for nature doesn't instantiate important Western under-
standings of religious experience. First, it doesn't fit under sociological
theory that, like Max Weber's, sees the content of religious experience to
be in some sense negative - limit, contingency, chaos, the problem of
evil." It has positive rather than negative content and in that respect sits
closer to Friedrich Schleiermacher, Rudolf Otto," and Mircea Eliade/3
than to William James.24 Second, however, it is not the same as Schleier-
macher's "feeling of absolute dependence," Otto's "awe of and attraction
19. Lenning, Creation - An Ecumenical Challenge, 20.
20. Ignatius's habitual prayer to Christ as "Creator and Lord" kept creation in view.
21. See W. S. F. Pickering, "Theodicy and Social Theory: An Exploration of the
Limits to Collaboration Between Sociologist and Theologian," Sociologyand Theology:
Alliance and Conflict, ed. David Martin, John Orrne Mills and W. S. F. Pickering (New
York: St. Martin's, 1980) 59-79.
22. Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Nonrational Factor in the
Idea of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational, trans. John W. Harvey (London:
Oxford, 1958).
23. Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. Willard
R. Trask (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1959).
24- William James, The Varietiesof Religious Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard,
1985).
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to the Numinous," Eliade's ritual ordering of the cosmos, William James'
soteriological 'religious experience' of union with the divine, Edward
Schillebeeckx's analysis of an "experience of grace.?" Bernard Lonergan's
idea of "faith" as reception of divine love prior to "belief" in religious
word or deed," or Karl Rahner's theme of the "supernatural existential.t"?
All these conceive the content (object) of religious experience to be God.
Respect for nature verging on reverence doesn't necessarily involve a sense
of divine otherness. Despite absence of a definite, felt reference to the
divine, non-human nature and human embeddedness in it are felt to
possess some sort of sacral depth," even though finite, visible, and quan-
tifiable. The green experience can be accommodated by Lonergan's idea
of religious experience as a dynamic condition of being in lovewith God,
but only if that condition can be understood as mediated by knowledge
of nature, so that God remains a clouded ultimate Source rather than
being, with Schleiermacher, that on which nature and humanity alike
are immediately felt to depend.
With that foregoing and major qualification, I will nonetheless retrieve
two things from Schleiermacher's concept of religious experience. First,
and contrary to a postliberal position that assigns a determining role to
language and doctrine in religious experience, experience of reverence
for nature, no less than, for example, experiences of consolation or deso-
lation described in the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius, occurs with a
spiritual spontaneity that does not simply fill in, derive from, or apply
theoretical or theological propositions. It takes place in a primary mode
like that discussed in Christian tradition as spirituality or piety. Conse-
quently, I think that even the mitigated postliberal view that all experi-
ence is theory-laden also over-determines any experience by making it
something prefigured in theory and thought. The postliberal view seems
to rule out new experience not preceded by an explicit, formulated idea.
Does that mean that the owl of Minerva flies at dawn not dusk, yet
already anticipates the whole day's labor in some type of foreknowledge?
Still, I will qualify Schleiermacher's primacy of experience by suppos-
ing that interpretation belongs to rather than follows after experience.
25· Edward Schillebeeckx, Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord, trans. J. Bowden
(New York: Crossroad, 1981), Part Two, "The New Testament Theology of the Experi-
ence of Grace," 81-628.
26. Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Crossroad, 1972).
27. Karl Rahner, The Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of
Christianity, trans. William V. Dych (New York: Seabury, 1978).
28. See the perspective of cell biologist Ursula Goodenough, in The Sacred Depths of
Nature (New York: Oxford, 1998).
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Here the nuanced view of Schillebeeckx, that every act of experiencing
contains an element of conceptual interpretation (perhaps informal), cor-
rects the Schleiermacherian tradition. But Schillebeeckx too may be
overly strong since his analysis does not allow clearly for an interpreta-
tive capacity in pre-conceptual meanings. I refer to meanings absorbed
in everyday, practical participation in social practice and interaction, in
an apparently 'thoughtless' or at least non-deliberated way. One approach
to thinking about this is through Hans-Georg Gadamer's rehabilitation
of truth in the form of valid, productive prejudice whose truthfulness
may well be affirmed in practice without a methodologically satisfactory
justification being available to everyone on all occasions.'? So I would
move to the view that experience always occurs within personal and social
horizons that lend interpretative possibilities. Horizons bound our knowl-
edge and interest from a given standpoint. They do not dictate content.
They are implied frameworks with room for new experience. Horizons
serve as interpretative frameworks whose initial impact, for example, may
be only to evoke a sense of distress before new data or ideas, or contrar-
ily to let a sense of peace predominate in the process of assimilating new
data or ideas."
Green experience of nature is a new experience that occurs within
contemporary horizons, such as an evolutionary worldview, postmod-
ern irony about the ideal of progress, and concern for the environment.
But the most basic characteristic of green experience, I propose, is not
its meaning or horizon or interpretation, but its truth. That is, the
experience takes place as the gradual dawning of true judgment in a
person, able to be communicated to others, that non-human natural
realities really exist. They are to be reckoned with as independent of
human existence, thought, science, purposes, hopes and plans. Contrary
to arrival at truth by methodical procedures and a series of conclusions,
this judgment happens with spontaneity apart from any method, as if
evoked by the reality of nature. The truth is like that involved in ordi-
nary acknowledgement or recognition of some human persons as really
existing and significant. This kind of judgment can emerge within
affective apprehension of nature and exceeds sensory knowledge as well
as concepts.
29. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (originally published as Wahrheit und
Methode in 1960) second, revised edition based on revised German edition of 1986,
trans. Joel C. Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York, Crossroad, 1991)
265f£
30. For discussion of horizons, see Lonergan, Method in Theology, 235-237.
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A second element retrievable from Schleiermacher's concept of reli-
gious experience is affective passivity. Mfective passivity means that
people could be said to undergo rather than produce religious experi-
ence. In fact, that passivity would seem to be a principal feature by which
to distinguish its authenticity from anything reflecting the prior self-
interest of the subject or subjects who are in that sense recipients. From
Schleiermacher to Schillebeeckx, from Otto to Lonergan, 'religious expe-
rience' is closer in meaning to the Greek concept of suffering (pathos)
than to empirical knowledge based on experience (episteme) that con-
trasts with an opinion (doxa) based on someone else'sexperiential knowl-
edge. Since religious experience is the most profound sort of passivity,
religion is humanity's most basic passion, and that about which people
can be most passionate."
Religion is a passion before it becomes a belief or a movement in a per-
son or a group, That passion need not be the privileged trait of a charis-
matic founder whose followers march into routinization. Like suffering,
religious experience takes place in human persons or groups without
anyone's invitation, apart from an individual's or a group's thought,
desire, plan, work and hope. Yet it enters so intimately into subjectivity
and into social bonds that humanity seems like its home, where it can
be respected or disregarded. It occurs in and to people, whether they seek
it or not. Preparation may precede and dispose people to it. When young
native-American men set out on a 'vision quest', they put themselves
in a position for religious experience. But the vision would have no
authority if it were received as anything less than an encounter with what
was other.
Once undergone by an individual or group, religious experience often
leads to subsequent production of various means to communicate it, or a
resultant way of life. Such means have included myth, ritual, segregation
of sacred places and times, oral and written word, special practices, etc."
For example, Black Elk, an important late nineteenth and early twentieth
31. For rhat reason it is a misrake to think of religious zealotry as no more than aber-
rant fanaticism nearing insanity. Rather, it is unprotected, incorrectly interpreted open-
ness to the power of humanity's most constitutive passion.
32. This is explored by sociologist Robert Wuthnow's marketing approach in Produc-
ing the Sacred: An Essay on Public Religion (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois, 1994). It is
worth remarking that, in light of divine inspiration, human 'producing' of the biblical texts
as means to communicate the sacred is understood to involve passivity too, insofar as it
was divine inspiration that initiated and evoked the creative labors of biblical authors and
probably to some extent also the prior processes of communal transmission of pre-textual
tradi dons.
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century Lakota Sioux shaman, dreamed of a healing harmony among his
people." He dreamed a carefully arranged ritual in which painted riders
and horses turned in unison and paraded in rows according to colors.
This was a dance of horse groups. The dream was a religious experience
but its full reality as a benefit for his people was realized only on the day
it was carried out in a sacred performance, which he, like an inspired
choreographer, guided or produced with the cooperation of horseback
riders from his clan. The dream became a public rite, a sacred product.
At the same time green consciousness of nature's sacrality does not
contain something essential to Schleiermacher, the feeling of absolute
dependence. Moreover, I assume that there is merit in the critique of
Schleriermacher, Otto and Eliade for including interpretative or explana-
tory principles in allegedly purely descriptive accounts of religious expe-
rience.>' Belief in the existence and creative activity of God is an inter-
pretative element that explains the cosmos and the experience. Once that
is postulated as internal to the feeling, the description contains its expla-
nation. It is true that this obscures philosophical analysis of religious
experience. More to the point here though, it purports to locate a purely
affective foundation for all other elements of any religion. Such an
approach, I agree, incorrectly isolates passive affectivity from thought.
Affective passivity in green experience of nature means only that the
felt awareness of nature as worthy or respect comes from experiential
knowledge of non-human nature rather that from human subjects or
society. It does not necessarily incorporate a feeling of dependence on
an Infinite Source, only a being-impressed in a specific way by nature.
Yet, to come upon Schleiermacher's mistake of trying to found religion
in a supposedly pure, affective experience prior to thought and deci-
sion doesn't also demand rejection of a characteristic role for affectiv-
ity in religious experience. Rather, correction and development is called
for, of the sort provided in diverse ways by Edward Schillebeeckx,
Bernard Lonergan and Charles Taylor," With Schleiermacher, they
accept affective passivity as a defining trait in religious experience. Yet
unlike Schleiermacher, all underline a structure of intentionality in
33. Black Elk's dream was inspired too. Nicholas Black Elk, Black Elk Speaks: Being
the Life-Story of a Holy Man of the Oglala Sioux as told through John Gneisenau Neihardt
(Flaming Rainbow) by Nicholas Black Elk; foreword by V. Deloria, Jr.; with illustrations
by Standing Bear (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska, 2000).
34. Wayne Proudfoot, Religious Experience (Berkeley,CA: University of California, 1985).
35. Charles Taylor, Varieties of Religion Today: WiUiam James Revisited (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University, 2002).
(GREEN) RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE SEEKING UNDERSTANDING 107
religious experience that keeps affective passivity and interpretative
consciousness internal to the experience.
For example, Lonergan emphasizes that affective spontaneity in any
area can be a "felt apprehension of values" that exist in realities outside
the one experiencing the feeling, and argues that the impact of divine love
brings new light to familiar phenomena ("faith is knowledge born of
10ve").36Schillebeeckx highlights the irreducible role of pre-theoretical
interpretation internal to any experience of Jesus or of grace (similar to
Lonergan's felt apprehension of valuesr.? Taylor extricates the social
dimensions of religious experience neglected by William james." Only
Lonergan, however, does not treat religious experience as primarily sore-
riological. This opens up space for an interpretative experience of nature
as somehow sacred, yet not soteriological in the sense o£ for example,
William James's sick soul burdened by a sense of sin finding relief.
So is green experience religious?The affirmative answer arises in atten-
tion to two poles in the human/nature relationship. One is respect for
natural entities primarily as existing-in-themselves rather than as being
on hand for-us. This, I take it, characterizes the green experience. The
other pole is a relationship to natural entities as resources for-us able to
be instrumental to our food, clothing and shelter. That is, along with a
legitimate for-us-ness in our attitude to nature as resource for our suste-
nance, there is also a prior, yet easily overlooked, in-itself-ness of natural
realities. The green experience of nature advances into or rediscovers the
in-itself-ness of nature, without (in reasonable, moderate opinions) deny-
ing the other pole, the for-us-ness of nature. This evokes respect. And the
respect is illuminated and interpreted by faith in God as Creator.
3. Theological Reflection
The green experience of non-human nature, granting it a sacral or reli-
gious quality, does not involve its own, complete, universally accepted
interpretation. An atheist, for instance, can experience nature as sacral,
yet not as created. That is, the green experience is not self-evidently
theist or creational despite being sacral. True, Paul in Romans I teaches
that creation witnesses to the Creator. He qualifies this in the spirit of
36. Lonergan, Method in Theology, II5.
37· Schillebeeckx, Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord, "Section Two: New Testa-
ment experiences of gtace and their interpretations," nzff,
38. Taylor, Varieties of Religion Today, esp. 22ff.
108 THOMAS HUGHSON
Israel's wisdom literature to the effect that universal human sinfulness
blocks passage from glimpses of the Creator's existence to glorification of
the transcendent One. Both Jewish and Christian faiths interpret the
experience of non-human nature in one fundamental way. Nature, the
cosmos, is something that has been created, not simply organized from
pre-existing, possibly eternal, matter. That was and is not self-evident
from the experience of non-human nature itself Many interpretations
became and remain available. Israel's creation faith, for example, emerged
amid many ancient Near Eastern creation myths and narratives. May not
all of them, including Genesis, arise from some variation on appreciative
respect for non-human nature as somehow sacral? This is to infer that
some manner of experience of nature as sacral belonged to all the creation
myths but under various interpretations. Israel's creation faith can be
understood as Israel's interpretation of that sacral experience, offered in
opposition to rival interpretations given in other ancient Near Eastern
cultures. Were not Israel's lapses from the First Commandment, whether
by a golden calf at Mt, Sinai or by King Solomon's infidelities or popu-
lar adoption of Canaanite, Philistine, etc., worship at the same time the
Israelites embrace, if only fleeting, of alternative interpretations of a sacral
experience of nature, contrary to the creation narratives in Genesis 1-2?
Could the experience of nature as almost sacred be the primordial dis-
closure of the transcendent and immanent divine Source? Informed by
science, not by the discredited idea of a positive, primal monotheistic
revelation to all ancient peoples, Thomas Berry proposes that "the uni-
verse, the solar system, and the planet earth in themselves and in their
evolutionary emergence constitute for the human community the pri-
mary revelation of that ultimate mystery whence all things emerge into
being."39If this includes all of non-human nature, then not only is Berry's
proposal theologically correct but important. And yet it is incomplete.
That 'primary revelation' is not self-evident but always includes an
interpretative component. Is the physical world the fall-out from a pri-
mordial murder and dismembering ofTiamut by Marduk? Or is it the
overcoming of material chaos by a divine organizing power? Or is it a rev-
elation of a Creator Who calls everything into being? Israel's creation
accounts in Genesis, wisdom literature and the prophets asserted a 'pri-
mary revelation' of the universe that interpreted the sacredness of nature
as due to its being created. Yet, suppose that the experience of nature
39· Quoted in Brennan HilI, Christian Faith and the Environment: Making Vital Con-
nections (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1998) 21.
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being interpreted within the horizons of meaning open to Israel was not
of 'creation' but of an ambiguous sacral nature open to many interpre-
tations, that is, not self-evidently a 'creation'. Then, to affirm it as 'cre-
ation' completes the already experienced sacrality of nature by relating it
to the meaning of an all-creating God.
It is well known that Claus Westermann corrected Gerhard von Rad
on the relative importance of Israelite creation faith. Von Rad had argued
that the Hebrew Scriptures treat the creature/Creator relationship as
something secondary, derived from the soteriological revelation given
above all in the Exodus.s? Westermann showed that in the Hebrew Scrip-
tures, a prior, lived relation to God as Creator and Source enveloped and
supported faith in God's deeds through Moses. It can be suggested that
the green religious experience of nature re-enters that sacrality of nature
prior to 'creation faith'. In that light, green experience like the ancient
Near Eastern experience of a somehow sacred nature lacks a full and self-
evident interpretation and so could be interpreted in many ways. But it
is open to 'creation faith', belief in and doctrine on God as Creator. This
means the green experience is primordial yet incomplete.
This experience is accessible without Jewish or Christian faith, since
access to it occurs in those deliberately distancing themselves from bibli-
cal religion. Jewish and Christian faiths interpret but do not produce or
annihilate the experience. It is a religious experience that in its priority
to a complete interpretation, as in 'creation', can be something Christians
and Jews have in common with the rest of humanity. That commonality
is rich in theological significance despite a tradition, as it were, of inat-
tention to religious experiences Christians have in common with others.
Indeed, Edward Schillebeeckx commented somewhere that Christians
and theologians often have settled their thought in the religious districts
of specifically Christian experiences of divine grace, thereby impoverish-
ing their knowledge of God and their ties with non-Christians. I agree
with that judgment, but another perspective disagrees.
According to that way of thinking, theology looks first of all to the
incommensurability between any religious experience and Christian faith
in divine revelation available in the Scriptural Word of God. Then, with
Karl Barth, it affirms the saving power of the truth in God's Word, and
rejects the theological significance of any religious experience other than
that formally identical with Christian faith. This path suits those believ-
ers, church leaders and theologians - Protestant and Catholic - who
40. For SchiIlebeeckx's position, see Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord, 515ff.
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already think that the most authentic Christian response to postmodern,
religiously pluralist, possibly post-Christian cultures is to magnify the
'Christian difference' in faith and morality," In such a perspective, the
paramount task of theology in examining any kind of religious experi-
ence that Christians have in common with non-Christians is to identify
and explain the 'Christian difference', so as to clarify the soteriological
superiority in explicit faith over anything, any experience, outside the
realm of Christian faith. It concludes in a definition of any supposed
common ground as confusion, and condemns this as the deterioration
of Christian faith into syncretism. In my judgment this approach lacks
humility before divine abundance.
The path indicated by Schillebeeckx looks to the concrete universal-
ity of divine love and grace, and takes into account the incompleteness
of Christian knowledge of God's ways, while granting always a suffi-
ciency of that knowledge for salvation. Such a path goes on to affirm the
infinite resourcefulness of the uncreated Logos Who has become incar-
nate, and the Holy Spirit, both relating to all creation. This approach also
associates itself with a primarily redemptive rather than condemnatory
raison d'etre for Christianity. On that basis theology starts by withhold-
ing negative judgment on new religious experiences in Christians, seeks
their meaning in light of the totality of Church and gospel, and does
not confuse tentative theological exploration with pastoral advice. This
is the path here. May it not be that the patristic concept of sperma Logou
scattered throughout creation may be found not only in ideas in non-
Christian sources but also in religious experiences not specifically Chris-
tian, such as the green experience?
For that reason, green experience of non-human nature may be of
interest to those thinking about inter-religious dialogue. In a very broad,
indirect wayVatican II's "Decree on the Church and Non-Christian Reli-
gions" (Nostra aetate) approved Catholic attention to it when it observed
that "throughout history even to the present day, there is found among
different peoples a certain awareness of a hidden power, which lies behind
the course of nature and the events of human life."42There is no reason
to assume that this statement precluded Christians too from having an
"awareness of a hidden power which lies behind the course of nature ... "
41. See an otherwise important book by Lewis Mudge, The Church tIS Moral Com-
munity: Ecclesiologyand Ethics in Ecumenical Debate (New York: Continuum, 1998).
42. Vatican II, Nostra Aetate, "Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-
Christian Religions," Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents, ed.
Austin Flannery (Northport, NY: Costello, 1988) 738-739-
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Equally, there is no reason to construe "awareness of a hidden power" as
a Cartesian awareness, divorced from affective apprehension of nature
as sacred.
Admittedly, it is not immediately apparent exactly where and how
inter-religious dialogue can accommodate a felt apprehension of nature
as somehow sacred. This is particularly the case if the presupposed model
for dialogue proceeds, as I witnessed in one symposium on Dominus jesus,
according to the earliest initiatives in Christian ecumenism where each
side to the dialogue presents its reality - be it practice, belief, institution,
ethic, or spirituality - in expectation of deepened mutual understanding
that leaves all parties where they were beforehand. This format envisions
no modification of starting-points. Yet, a sense of nature as somehow
sacred incorporates awareness of nothing distinctive to a given religion.
It has the characteristic quality of being more primordial than religious
division. So it would not fit on the agenda of an exchange model of
inter-religious dialogue, though it could be brought into other kinds of
inter-religious dialogue. It would fit most obviously in dialogues with
indigenous peoples adhering to traditional, tribal ways of life in Africa
and elsewhere.
Theological reflection on the green experience also can begin to think
about the differences between non-human nature and fallen creation.
A re-reading of the creation narratives in Genesis has become common.
For instance, McFague explains the importance of the five divine bless-
ings upon what has been created.f The Creator concluded each of the
first five days by pronouncing a blessing on what had come forth. The
five-fold, "and it was good," expresses divine approval for what divine love
and wisdom had brought into existence. What existed prior to human-
ity was 'good' by itself not by its usefulness to Adam and Eve. Heavens
and earth, sky and sea, plants and animals were already real and good
before humanity came on the scene. This is the context for understand-
ing the mandate to exercise 'dominion': it is to be a limited imitation
of the divine kind of creative sovereignty that treats non-human nature
as intrinsically real and worthwhile apart from its extrinsic relation of
usefulness to humanity.
This position can be developed if the idea of integrity expands. There
are two aspects in the integrity of non-human nature: (I) existence inde-
pendent of humanity that deserves respect, (2) being created and existing
apart from sin. The first was affirmed by the 1990 WCC Convocation in
43. McFague, Super, Natural Christians, 1641f.
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Seoul, when it spoke about nature's integrity as its reality prior to a rela-
tion to humanity and its worth as intrinsic, apart from what servesa human
good. The WCC affirmation belongs to a new reading of Gen I that focuses
on God's blessing of non-human creation as "good" prior to human exis-
tence. For the WCe, that independent value in non-human creation has
become a guiding principle for a Christian environmental ethic.
But there is more to the integrity and goodness of nature than that.
A second meaning of integrity has to do with the sinlessness, the inno-
cence, of non-human nature according to Genesis. The green experience
of nature contains inchoate apprehension of human beings belonging
to a community of finite, natural realities with a whole cosmic history.
But this is compatible with and recovers a kind of presence in nature
recounted as part of what Genesis describes in terms of Adam and Eve
in Eden before the Fall. It's always Eden in non-human nature, though
not the idyllic paradise we like to imagine. This is to conclude that rev-
erence for nature typical in the green experience is a postmodern resur-
facing of universal human access to what can be thought of as the pre-
lapsarian 'religion' of proto-humanity, of Adam and Eve. This would
be a way of being in communion with Creator and creation without
external, organized or, strictly speaking, salvific elements. The green expe-
rience, then, is non-soteriological, proto-religious experience rather than
an instance of a kind of 'religious experience' that generates all specific
religions, as Schleiermacher imagined was the case.
So the hypothesis briefly and tentatively entertained here is that the
green religious experience can be understood within Jewish and Chris-
tian horizons as postmodern recognition that non-human nature has
always existed in a pre-lapsarian condition. A pre-lapsarian condition has
always been true of non-human creation, predator/prey relations and all.
Animals did not fall into sin, have remained unaffected by it internally,
and do not need salvation. Pre-moral, non-human natural beings did not
originate sin, do not bear its guilt, cannot initiate sin or concupiscence,
and do not transmit either original sin or concupiscence.
As Aquinas pointed out, non-human animals love and obey the
Creator in a pre-moral way by instincrually following their natures that
tend to their flourishing. Consequently, they not only are innocent of sin
but exist in obedience to their Creator, by contrast with their human
co-inhabitants of the planet. This does not seem to contradict Church
teaching on original sin, nor the more recent emphasis on a pervasive,
socially constructed sin of the world. The human Fall into sin, according
to Paul, subjected creation to futility from which it groans for release
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by the power of God's redeeming grace. The groaning for release can be
understood as the finitude of physical existents in time, with death as a
conclusion. An alternative possibility - a creation composed of immortal
animals, plants, and cosmos - would be so distant from known reality
as to be more than a pristine version of it. Nature's subjection to futility
can be understood as non-human nature instrumentalized to the futile
purposes of human sinfulness. For example, the rider of a powerful horse
might head to a violent deed in which the horse's speed and strength
enable the rider to rob, murder and then make an escape. But the horse
remains innocent, as did lions killing Christian martyrs in the Roman
Coliseum, or the wooden beams of the Cross of Christ, the lead in a
murdering bullet, the hydrogen in a hydrogen bomb. All are innocent,
pre-moral instruments subjected to human ends. Here, pre-moral artic-
ulates a contrast with humanity called to set its own course but also con-
veys the idea of unwavering fidelity to the Creator by instinctual actions.
Theology traditionally has not dwelt upon a pre-Iapsarian proto-reli-
gion, a religion-before-religion. Many would object to the idea as unsa-
vory speculation on what is at best a lost possibility and not anything
actual, a new case of a hypothetical natura pura. Others might dismiss it
as part and parcel of what Genesis presents more by way of the setting for
an etiological myth explaining sin and death than as a revealed moment
in humanity's existence. In either case it would be speculation on some-
thing that no longer has any significance for the historical economy of
redemption. But if religion-before-religion surfaces in the green experience
of non-human nature, then what might seem to be merely a speculative
possibility is something actual and common, but not necessarily known.
Moreover, a regained proto-religion does have redemptive significance.
In a fallen human world it cannot be other than the experience of sin-
ful people in disordered societies. Nevertheless, the green experience has
an effect supportive of salvific realities, though its content is pre-soteri-
ological. It renews and restores respect for non-human creatures that sin
had impeded. To that extent, respect for non-human nature verging on
reverence can be considered an event of grace in which a dimension of
human existence begins to shift into proper alignment with non-human
creatures and so to become in that area more in accord with the Creator
of all. This kind of shift, not necessarilya matter of methodical judgment
or deliberated decision but a gradual, spontaneous openness to non-human
others, is conversion insofar as it is a transformation of the subject and
the subject's world. It invites revision and introduces novelty into familiar,
problematic ways of relating to non-human nature.
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Religious conversion, according to Bernard Lonergan, is a dynamic
condition that spontaneously changes attitudes. Respect for non-human
nature verging on reverence is a change from an instrumentalist attitude
toward the whole of non-human nature, not only that which is the object
of a given perception. Something brings about this change. Is it an
advance in theoretical knowledge? Whatever the source - and the green
experience of nature is at least a strong possibility to the extent that a per-
son or group accepts the change - respect verging on reverence becomes
a moral orientation influencing the whole of human existence relating to
non-human nature. Reasoning from effect to cause, where a green attitude
takes hold in a person or group, there a change amounting to conversion
has produced it and underlies it. For example, the environmental move-
ment has that moral orientation. If this analysis has been correct, what
has generated this most basically is a change from indifference or instru-
mentalism to respect verging on reverence for non-human nature. The
environmental movement therefore depends on an unnoticed conver-
sion. In this regard Jewish and Christian 'creation faith' clarifies an expe-
rience to which all peoples have access. 'Creation faith' brings into the
light of divine revelation a conversion in regard to non-human nature
that so far lacks an agreed upon theological name.
If that is so, then to the extent that Christianity and the Church
affirm, support, encourage and bless this green experience, Christianity
and the Church will act in accord with the Creator and Lord. May it
not be that an underdeveloped, deteriorating 'creation faith' underlies
the decline of faith in Western Europe and North America? Correla-
tively, may it not be that recuperation and deepening of 'creation faith'
by attention to the green experience can become a new pre-evangeliza-
tion as groundwork for any new evangelization in postmodern Western
cultures?
To conclude this section I would like to note a perhaps obvious direc-
tion in systematic theology consistent with the green experience become
'creation faith'. Biblical wisdom Christology including the Pauline theme
of Christ as the new Adam, the deutero-Pauline theme of Christ as first-
born of creation, and Johannine Logos Christology would be a fruitful
place in Scripture from which to develop a line of reflection that could
complement or challenge some other approaches today. Vatican II's focus
on the Church as the (potentially) new unity of the human race seems
a promising theme for ecclesiological reflection. The green experience
also is a place from which to renew or reclaim liturgy as celebration of
finality to God's glory in the whole of creation.
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4. Conclusion: Experience, Method, and the Non-Methodical
By way of a conclusion, I will advert to two methodological issues.
Lonergan'sMethod in Theology will be the background. First I will try to
clarify a bit more the role of religious experience in theology. It is well
known that early twentieth-century Catholic teaching barred religious
experience from Christian faith and Catholic theology. In 1907, the anti-
Modernist encyclical of Pius X, Pascendi Dominici Gregis,and the decree
Lamentabili closed the door on religious experience in reaction against
an erroneous immanentism that subordinated revealed truths to subjec-
tive experience, or sought to derive all revelation from it. Reversing the
usual modern sequence of Catholic theology retracing steps already taken
by Protestant theology, in the late twentieth century, postliberal Protes-
tant theology followed the path of Pius X by likewise rejecting religious
experience as a theological principle.f The postliberal argument applies
the philosophical view that language constitutes the forms for, rather
than expresses the content of, experience. This inverts Schleiermacher
by insisting that religious language and doctrine produce religious expe-
riences, rather than the other way around. On that view, religious expe-
rience can be accepted as a fact, but is not able to be a principle for
theology. However, this view fails to see that Schillebeeckx, Rahner, Lon-
ergan, Taylor among others do not simply carry on Schleiermacher's affec-
tive foundationalism in sustaining use of religious experience as a prin-
ciple in theology.
So there is no need to treat religious experience and revelation as
antitheses, or as in a one-way cause/effect relationship from either side.
Rahner, Schillebeeckx, and Lonergan have shown how experience and
truth are interdependent. There can be new, unexpected religious expe-
rience underived from prior knowledge or conviction. But it takes place
in some reference to already actual tradition, knowledge, and historically-
effected personal and social horiwns, all of which supply subliminal inter-
pretative perspectives often embedded in practice rather than professed
in theories. In three ways this discussion of the green experience of nature
has headed along this path, rather than a liberal, Schleiermachian path
or Lindbeck's postliberal path.
First, the essay affirms an original spontaneity in the experience of
nature underived from prior knowledge or custom yet not without a link
44. See George Lindbeck's criticism of Lonergan for an "experiential-expressive"
approach in the tradition of Friedrich Schleiermacher in The Nature of Doctrine ..Religion
and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster, 1984) 32.
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with or reference to personal and social meaning. Yet the affirmation
does not make religious experience so unto itself that it lacks a prepared
context of common meanings, which people often acquire practically by
participating in typical practices, such as economic activities in earning
a livelihood, political activities such as voting, or cultural activities such
as recreation. Lonergan refers to this kind of knowledge as a culturally
relative common sense, clearly distinguished from theoretical knowledge,
and the green experience of nature in respect verging on reverence occurs
in reference to those common meanings, though they don't produce the
experience. For example, the green experience of respect for nature occurs
within a postmodern horiwn of meaning that no longer idolizes progress.
Sometimes according any priority to experience is thought to be exactly
what hermeneutics overcomes in the turn to language." But Gadamer,
for example, is not so doctrinaire. He does not so much establish the
unremitting priority of historically determinate language in every possi-
ble human experience as he shows why any experience remains incom-
plete, still inchoate, apart from expression in some specific, culturally
shaped language that eventually links the new experience to the social
horizons of a tradition. Pre-linguistic experience such as producing or
listening to music, or producing or appreciating sculpture, (or a green
experience of non-human nature) is always underway toward language,
so that for Gadamer experience comes to completion in the social act of
communicating its fact, meaning, and meaningfulness.
Second and theologically, the discussion placed the green experience
of nature in a positive interpretative relationship with revelation and
the doctrines of faith, above all the First Article of the Creed backed
by Jewish monotheism. Both profess that God created non-human nat-
ural realities and human beings. They do not eternally and necessarily
emanate from a First Cause, nor are they products of a Supreme Orga-
nizer of chaos, or artifacts from a local deity or spirit that presides over
a particular region, mountain range, river, or forest, etc.
Finally, I would like to emphasize that theological attention to the
green religious experience exemplifies how an empirical turn keeps theo-
logical method true to its non-logical, non-methodical operations. Green
religious experience invites theology to appropriate its indispensable part-
nership with what is not predictable, controllable, or logically derivable
45· See Francis Schussler Fiorenza, "Systematic Theology: Tasks and Methods," Sys-
tematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives,ed. Francis Schussler Fiorenza and John
P. Galvin (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, I99I) 3-87, esp. 43-44.
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from the accumulated body of theological understanding. Theological
method is a way of raising and answering questions in an ordered move-
ment toward increased understanding of the significance and role of
Christianity in its cultural matrices. But only divine understanding fully
comprehends what it brings into existence out of love: creation and the
economy of redemption centered in Christ and the Spirit. By analogy,
this divine knowledge might be thought of as logical and systematic
because it is in possession of all facts, relations, causes and effects, con-
sequences, etc., of created reality, including outcomes from human free-
dom. This might be taken as the fullness with a standing of a goal which
theology seeks to approximate asymptotically, though Aquinas more
modestly saw the knowledge of the blessed in heaven as the source to
which theology was subalternate.
Yet the unlikeness to systematic theology, of course, is greater. Divine
knowledge (and the knowledge of the blessed) does not consist in dis-
cursive movement in reasoning from facts to truths, or from truths to
truths, or from truths to meanings. Logic does not pertain. This contrasts
with mortal faith and theology, which do move in that way, so that logic
is important for correct movement in reasoning. The temporality of logic
as distinguished from the eternity of vision points up its relative, provi-
sional role within mortal theology. This means that the subject matter
of theology, divine revelation and faith, is not like human, theoretical
knowledge pre-organized logically so that logic and method would be
merely attaining a pre-existing order in understanding. This suggests that
logic and method in theology cannot be definitive for theology. But this
need not be taken as the only reason not to define theology primarily in
terms of logical operations.
Lonergan defines method as "a normative pattern of recurrent and
related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results." He adds
that, " ... the operations envisaged are not limited to strictly logical oper-
ations, that is, to operations on propositions, terms, relations ... describ-
ing ... formulating problems and hypotheses ... deducing implications.Y"
Some non-logical operations are, " ... inquiry, observation, experiment,
synthesis, verification."47 Success in the natural sciences has resulted
from scientific method combining logical operations of deduction, infer-
ence, classification, and formulation with non-logical operations of dis-
covery, experiment, and verification. In fact, the dynamics of intentional
46. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 4.
47. Ibid.
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consciousness are acts or operations that do not consist in logically
ordered inferences, classifications, formulae. For example, neither sen-
sory attentiveness to objects, nor moving to inquiry about them, nor
checking an impression are purely logical operations. On this basis one
expects that theology, too, has non-logical operations akin to discovery,
experiment and verification in the sciences.
For example, fifteenth and sixteenth century European voyages of
'discovery' (who was dis-covered? Exotic others, Europeans, or both to
each other?) brought new lands and unexpected peoples into the ken of
Western Christian theology and philosophy. New realities were new data
for theology because they were significant for Christian faith and mission.
Did the inhabitants of the Indies have immortal souls? Ought they be
evangelized?Various answers were given. This was a matter of empirically
discovering new facts and coming to grips with them theologically, not
only of logically inferring new conclusions from theological principles
already gained from revelation. New experiences of human reality, of
alien religious outlooks, raised new questions about their relation to
Christian mission.
Another example is green experience of nature. It too, is a non-logi-
cal operation with an aspect of being a new fact present to theology.
If theologians pay attention to it, they might be said to 'discover' it for
theology in a way that is not true for revelation and faith, which are
theology's constant source. Like a discovery, recognition of its integrity
and theological potential comes about in a "Eureka!" or "That's it!"
moment in relating to non-human nature as other than human and as
extrinsic to, even when instrumental for, human purposes. This means
that green experience is a new datum. Once accepted as a datum rele-
vant to theology, theological method then can guide operations probing,
interpreting, organizing, hypothesizing, and revising with logical rigor.
But more importantly, as noted in the previous section, the green expe-
rience of non-human nature can be understood theologically as a form
of religious conversion to creation faith, perhaps minor by comparison
to gospel conversion but real nonetheless. As such it provides part of a
personal foundation for theological thought on Christian doctrines.
Chapter II of Method in Theology outlines the functional specialty
of foundations. Lonergan addresses moral, religious and intellectual con-
version as realities in the theologian foundational for three further spe-
cialties, doctrines, systematics, and communications. Religious conversion
cannot be produced by theological content or method. It is a matter
of the Spirit and the theologian's personal development as a baptized
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believer,yet objectifying the horizon of religious conversion is the proper
goal of foundations. Religious conversion does not consist in exercise of
a methodical task but contributes the substance for methodical tasks.
And that is the case for the green religious experience too: it presents the-
ologywith a new fact of experience that consists in a type of intellectual,
moral and religious conversion. Theology seeks to objectify the new hori-
zons, then put them into relation with other doctrines of the faith, and
understand them as part of the unity of faith. Finally, communications
has the task of bringing this Catholic result into dialogue with other
kinds and fields of knowledge, with evangelization, with other Christian
churches, and with other religions.
